

Mariana Perez Sierra

Expandiendo La Herida: How US Training Exacerbated Human Rights Violations
During Chile's Dictatorship

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Abstract

Chile's dictatorship from 1973-1990 was marked by extreme human rights violations committed by the state against its population. The legacy of this period has left what human rights advocates call an enduring 21st-century "herida abierta" (open wound) in Chile. Numerous scholars and human rights advocates argue that the US's training of Chilean personnel exacerbated torture, disappearances, and inhumane treatment. However, the particular mechanisms through which the US shaped Chilean security personnel behavior remain unclear. This paper uses declassified CIA documents, Chilean reports, and a roster of 60,000 Latin Americans who graduated from the US School of the Americas training facility to demonstrate that (1) the US trained a large number of Chilean officers, (2) US curriculum taught repressive methods that violated human rights under the UDHR, (3) Chilean personnel who committed violations used methods that closely resembled techniques discussed in the US curriculum, and (4) a substantial number of US-trained Chileans are linked to human rights violations. This study highlights the importance of restrictions on the types of training that US military forces offer foreign security personnel.

La Herida Abierta

The 1973-1990 military dictatorship that governed Chile was marked by substantial human rights abuses, with more than 40,000 people tortured, disappeared, executed, or subject to political violence (National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture 2011). The historically designated 1990 “end” to the dictatorship sparked a new beginning for Chile—initiating a struggle for political, social, and human rights justice (Corral 2024).

Fifty years after the coup, the conventional wisdom holds that the US contributed to human rights abuses carried out by the Chilean military regime and the forming of the “herida abierta” (i.e., the ‘open societal wound’)(Walker 2020; Schmidli 2010; Kornbluh 2004; Absher, Grier & Grier 2023; Gustafson 2003).¹ Grassroots movements, advocacy organizations, and scholars typically argue that the US exacerbated these abuses, or at least contributed to the violence, through its provision of military aid, counterinsurgency tools, and training (Walker 2020; Schmidli 2010; Kornbluh 2004; Gustafson 2003; SOA Watch, n.d.).

Nevertheless, it remains unclear exactly in what ways the US played a role in escalating human rights violations committed by the Chilean military regime (Walker 2020; McCoy 2005; O’Rourke 2018; Peksen 2011). Until recently, most of the relevant US government materials remained classified, making it difficult to pin down the ways in which the US contributed to human rights abuses in Chile. The US government's release of heavily redacted documents, starting on June 30, 1999, and the most recent in August of 2023, are puzzle pieces scholars are beginning to put together to better understand the role of the US in this traumatic Chilean period (Boucher 2001). While this more up to date research has established broad links between US

¹ “La herida” refers to the embedded societal wound created through the murders, disappearances, tortures, and dehumanization in Chilean society. The wound is considered “abierto,” or open, as communities continue searching for forcibly detained-disappeared loved ones, advocating for judicial justice, and demanding the declassification of documents that conceal the violations committed by military officials.

military training and Chilean human rights abuses, it does not yet adequately demonstrate the mechanisms through which the US influenced the Chilean state's behavior.

In this paper, I highlight a series of mechanisms through which the CIA was able to influence the behavior of Chilean military personnel. In particular, I demonstrate how US foreign military training taught tools used by Chilean officials during the dictatorship, which resulted in human rights abuses. Using secondary sources and recently declassified primary source materials, I highlight how the US appeared to promote human rights violations in Chile in the following ways:

- 1) The US trained a substantial number of Chilean security personnel in counterinsurgency methodology.
- 2) The training curriculum taught Chilean officials methods that are indirectly and directly linked to human rights violations.
- 3) Tools used by Chilean security personnel for the violation of human rights mirrored US training.
- 4) There are a substantial number of Chilean personnel who have been either (1) convicted of a human rights violation, (2) under judicial investigation, and/or (3) identified as the dictatorship's detention center personnel.

The study illustrates a need to demand restrictions on US training facilities, as they have historically exacerbated human rights violations and expanded the "herida abierta" of the Chilean state, and potentially others.

What We Know About US Influence Before and During Chile's Dictatorship

While scholarly literature has demonstrated that the US was heavily involved in Chilean affairs during 1964-1973, what remains unclear is how US interventions shaped the Chilean military regime. Following growing human rights concerns during the mid-20th century and the declassification of CIA documents, debates emerged about whether US interventions influenced states' human rights violations. To investigate whether the US affected violations, several scholars have researched the effects US military training had on foreign security personnel behavior. Despite numerous studies, I argue that the existing literature has not identified *how* the US shaped Chilean military behavior.

Literature Is Unclear on How US Training Shaped Personnel Behavior

It is well-documented that the US intervened extensively in Chile before and during the dictatorship through economic aid, propaganda campaigns, and military assistance (Walker 2020; Schmidli 2010; Kornbluh 2004; Absher, Grier & Grier 2023; Gustafson 2003). A 1975 US Senate Select Committee report documents clandestine methods of US intervention (US Senate 1975). The report revealed that the strategies varied: for instance, the US spent \$13,400,000 on propaganda during 1963-1973 for the prevention of a "Communist" Chile (US Senate 1975: 7). Peter Kornbluh's compilation of hundreds of CIA documents further unveil secret rendezvous between CIA and Chilean officials, payment arrangements for the transfer of weapons, and the CIA's written support for Chile's dictator—Augusto Pinochet (Kornbluh 2013: 22- 52, 101, 140, 577). Gustafson (2020), Nichols (2019), and Lowenthal and Mostajo (2010) discuss similar tactics, revealing a significant US presence in Chilean politics. Through state reports and

academic research, the public's broad understanding of the US's covert and overt interventions in Chile has grown.

Following the end of the war in Vietnam, numerous critics raised concerns that the US was promoting human rights abuses in various countries around the world. Scholars and human rights advocates found links between the foreign security officials who attended US training facilities and committed gross violations in their countries (Omelycheva, Carter, Campbell, 2019; Martinez Machain 2017). These links ignited a 1993 decade-long Congressional struggle to close the School of the Americas (SOA)—one of the largest training facilities from 1946-2001 (Grimmett & Sullivan n.d.; “Lawmakers Push For...,” 1996; SOA Watch, n.d.). Human rights advocates further criticized the US training effects when the US declassified numerous CIA training manuals. The manuals revealed that the US training curriculum promoted methods of torture to foreign military officials (McCoy 2005; Grimmett & Sullivan n.d.; Martinez Machain 2021). Even with some evidence that the US's training may have affected the behavior of foreign personnel, the US government has not investigated the human rights effects of its training facilities (SOA Watch, n.d.). The particular impact of US intervention on a foreign country's human rights remains unclear, but scholars have studied military training to understand whether the US affected military personnel behavior.

The traditional position held by the US is that military training is foundational for human rights promotion in Latin American countries like Chile, a position that has some support in the academic literature. The official position holds that while human rights instruction was formerly absent in Latin America, US training facilities introduced “military professionalism and respect for civilian authority” (“Lawmakers Push for...,” 1996: 5). Two proponents of this position are Laurienti (2009) and Brewers (1995). Brewers (1995) finds that US training facilities enhanced

the “competency” of security personnel in Latin America and used the International Geneva Convention standards to teach officials how to treat civilians humanely (1995: 96, 118). For instance, Brewers (1995: 95-96) finds that after the US trained the Salvadoran military, there was a decrease in the number of “politically motivated killings” by military officials. Similarly, Laurienti (2009: 58-59) finds a positive link between increased US training and the implementation of human rights policies for the treatment of civilians in Bolivia and Colombia. Laurienti (2009) compares the countries to Venezuela, where US training decreased and human rights abuses grew. Although Laurienti (2009) and Brewers (1995) demonstrate links between US training and human rights, they lack an outline of specific mechanisms—e.g., curriculum, instructed tools, or courses— that reveal *how* the US ‘improved’ states’ human rights.

However, most research on the question of US intervention in Latin America suggests that the US exacerbated the human rights violations committed by security personnel in states like Chile (McCoy 2005; O’Rourke 2018; Peksen 2011). McCoy (2005) assesses the effect of the number of SOA courses attended on the human rights abuses conducted. From a list of 11,792 SOA graduates, McCoy (2005) finds that as a student took more SOA courses, there was a higher probability of committing a human rights abuse (i.e., torture). McCoy (2005) also finds that higher ranked officials were more likely to commit rights abuses. Although McCoy (2005) draws an individual student link between increased US courses and repression, he fails to outline instructed training methods and tools that plausibly explain *how* the US influenced security personnel behavior.

Other research begins to identify mechanisms the US used to shape the human rights violations committed by Latin American personnel but lack a step-by-step assessment linking the mechanisms to rights violations (Schmidli 2010; Lauderback 2004; Nelson-Pallmeyer 2002).

Schmidli (2010) assesses US military tools, strategies, and their role in the violent counterinsurgency of Argentina. Additionally, both Schmidli (2010) and Lauderback (2004) extensively assess training facilities and allude to the potential human rights violations caused by US training. Similarly, a study by Nelson-Pallmeyer (2002) notably compares Truth Commission Reports and SOA training manuals for a trans-continental examination of US training effects on Latin American security officials. These sources begin to identify training content and tools that could have shaped personnel behavior. However, the research fails to form a clear link between the training and the human rights violations committed by military personnel.

Literature Identifies Broad Mechanisms That Link US Training and Human Rights Violations

A few studies create a strong association between US training and exacerbated human rights violations by security personnel in Latin America; however, the literature only identifies broad US mechanisms. The mechanisms lack an in-depth assessment of the specific methods promoted by the US and the ways in which they shaped personnel behavior. The mechanisms include the following: (1) US counterinsurgency training, which increased the size of states' repressive toolboxes, and (2) the "expertise mechanism" that describes how security personnel gain legitimacy and prestige from US training.

Counterinsurgency training and the expertise mechanism broadly explain how US training can exacerbate the repression committed by foreign security personnel (Scharpf 2020; Lauderback 2004; Fitch 1993; Weeks 2003; Meierding & Sigman 2021: 7). Scharpf (2020) argues that through the counterinsurgency mechanism, SOA instructors taught security personnel technical and "strategic" skills not previously available to Latin American militaries. These new skills increased their capacity to repress civilians (Scharpf 2020: 739-740). Fitch (1993: 16) and

Weeks (2003: 12) also find that training instilled a “doctrine” of counterinsurgency in trainees, which promoted that personnel eliminate all “internal enemies.” Thus, scholars argue that through counterinsurgency training, military personnel were more likely to repress civilians (Weeks 2003: 15; Fitch 1993). Similarly, Mierding and Sigman’s (2021: 7) “expertise mechanism” suggests that due to the US’s supposed military and political superiority, trainees gained an “elitist self-image” that made them feel entitled to use learned repressive tools. Scholars find that from the legitimacy and counterinsurgency tools gained by officials, there was a higher likelihood that foreign personnel would commit rights violations against their populations (Scharpf 2020: 736; Fitch 1979; Meierding & Sigman 2021).

Existing literature does not make clear what particular mechanisms could have been used to affect security personnel behavior. While most scholars identify that the US exacerbated the rights violations committed by military personnel and some pinpoint to a few mechanisms, they are broad and lack a description of the US curriculum, the number of trainees, and the courses offered. In short, we do not have a clear picture of US training and *how* it shaped the rights violations committed by personnel.

Research Design: Identifying the Mechanisms of US Influence

In this paper, I seek to understand the mechanisms through which US training shaped abuses carried out by Chilean security forces. Specifically, I use information detailed in primary documents to address a series of questions about the link between US training and Chilean officials who received that training.

Sources

I draw on original US government and Chilean public reports covering 1964-1977. The 1964-1973 period involved large-scale economic and political US interventions in Chile; thus, I assess US government documents recording US training courses, state rhetoric, strategies, and recommended military tools from those years (US Senate 1975). To examine whether there is a link between US training and Chilean military behavior, I assess the 1973-1977 period. In this period, Chilean officials committed the most human rights abuses, so I analyze Chilean public reports covering the behaviors and military devices used by personnel during those years (Informe 2005: 231-232; United Nations 1948).

Investigating the Links Between US Intervention and Chilean Personnel Behavior

Using these sources, I address four key questions that investigate *how* US military training influenced the human rights violations committed by Chilean security personnel.

1. Did Chilean security personnel receive training by US military forces?

To begin with, for US intervention to have an effect, there had to be a way for the US to convey its influence on Chilean personnel behavior. Thus, first, I identify whether there is significant evidence that the US trained Chilean security personnel from 1964-1973. I collect information on courses attended, length of training, officer ranks, and US funds invested into training. I focus on the School of the Americas (SOA) training facility because it provides the most declassified information on training specifics and foreign graduates (McLauchlin 2022). I draw information from (a) the SOA graduate roster collected by the SOAW via Freedom of Information Act requests and (b) US government sources (e.g., the 1966 Department of Defense Counterinsurgency Bluebook) (SOA Watch, n.d; Ambinder, 2013). These documents do not

reveal a direct link between SOA training and violations but do identify whether the US could have influenced the abuses carried out by Chilean personnel.

2. Did the training curriculum promote human rights abuses?

For the US to have shaped the methods used by Chilean personnel who committed rights abuses, there must be evidence that the SOA's training promoted tools or behavior that constituted human rights violations. Drawing from the only 1960s declassified US training manual that was incorporated in the SOA from 1965-1966 until 1976—the CIA's 1963 KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual—I investigate whether tools or behavior promoted in the SOA constituted direct or indirect human rights violations (Schmidli 2010; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 1991). Specifically, I interpret US violations using the UDHR's Article 5, which states, “No one shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” and Article 9, that states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile” (United Nations 1948). If the KUBARK manual recommended repressive tools, a plausible link between SOA training and abuses committed by Chile's personnel can begin to form.

3. Did the tools used by Chilean forces mirror the training methods promoted by the US?

To find a link between US training and Chilean force behavior, I draw from the Valech Report and investigate whether Chilean security personnel who committed human rights violations in 1973-1977 did so using tools that the US training methods promoted. The CIA used KUBARK to train Latin American personnel beginning in the latter 1960s; thus, Chileans potentially implemented such tools during the dictatorship (Schmidli 2010; Office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense 1991). Given that the 2003-2005 Spanish-language Valech Report is the only comprehensive Chilean report that details the particular torture methods used by Chilean personnel, it can facilitate the investigation of whether Chilean tools mirrored US-promoted methods. Through an order by Chile's president, Ricardo Lagos, the government created a commission that compiled 35,868 testimonies and documented torture, detention center repression, and violations during the dictatorship (US Institute of Peace, 2003).

4. *Did Chilean security personnel who received US training carry out human rights abuses?*

For there to be a plausible link between US training and human rights violations committed by Chilean personnel, there must also be evidence that a substantial number of Chilean officials who received SOA training carried out rights abuses. I examine the *number* of Chilean officials who (1) attended the SOA from 1964-1973 and (2) were involved in human rights violations between 1973-1977. Only a few secondary sources have cross-referenced the names of SOA-trained Chilean personnel from the SOAW's 60,000-person roster to public trial records that track their involvement in human rights violations (McCoy 2005: 51). I build on secondary sources by conducting a large-scale, individual assessment of SOA Chilean trainees and their link to human rights abuses. I trace Chilean SOA graduates who are either (1) convicted of a human rights violation, (2) under judicial investigation, or (3) identified as torture center personnel. I cross-reference a random sample of 220 SOA graduates with the Memoria Viva website, ChatGPT, the Museo De La Memoria y Derechos Humanos database, and Google. I cannot create a direct link between SOA training and the violations committed by personnel, but I can assess whether a significant proportion of US-trained Chileans carried out abuses.

An Analysis of Mechanisms Through Which the US Exacerbated Human Rights Violations

Through an investigation of four interlinked questions, I find substantial evidence that demonstrates *how* the US exacerbated the human rights violations committed by Chilean personnel. First, I find that the US allocated significant funding for the instruction of a variety of courses and military skills that are still not fully declassified. I also find that Chile had some of the highest numbers of SOA graduates in Latin America. Second, the investigation reveals that the US taught foreign personnel repressive methods that were either direct or indirect human rights violations. Third, there are substantial parallels between tools instructed by the US and Chilean personnel behavior. The link reveals that the US-promoted methods were foundational for the deterioration of not only the physical but even the psychological state of detainees. Fourth, I find that a substantial number of SOA-trained Chilean officials committed rights violations. The rest of this section draws from several primary sources to detail plausible mechanisms that link US training to the human rights violations committed by Chilean officers.

1. Evidence of Substantial Chilean Security Personnel Training at the SOA

The principal source I draw from is the SOAW's 60,000-person roster of SOA graduates (SOA Watch, n.d.). The roster records Latin American trainee names, ranks, courses, and dates of attendance, with the earliest in 1944 and the latest in 2006. Using US Department of Defense (DoD) and CIA documents, including (a) the 1966 Counterinsurgency Bluebook, (b) weekly reports, and (c) the 1975 Church Committee Report, I draw further details on the SOA curriculum and the funding allocated for the facility.


Out of the 17 Latin American countries the US trained, Chile's security personnel was one of the most substantially trained groups. Drawing from the SOAW roster, Figure 1 illustrates

that 1,014 Chileans graduated from the SOA in the span of 9 years (1964-1973). The highest number of Chileans were trained after 1967, suggesting that officials trained by the US were likely involved in Chile's 1973-1977 extreme rights violations committed by state personnel against its civilians (Informe 2005: 231-232). The SOAW roster further reveals that Chile contained one of the highest numbers of SOA-trained graduates, with 755 from neighboring Argentina and 363 from Brazil—a country with ten times the population of Chile (“Brazil Population,” n.d.; “Chile Population,” n.d.). The length of courses ranged, with some as short as 32 days and others as long as 277 days. A diverse range of ranked officials attended, but more than half of Chilean trainees were second lieutenants—one of the lowest army ranks. The subject matter also varied widely, with Chilean personnel who attended 83 distinct SOA courses, including Combat Arms Orientation, Command for the Enlisted, and Basic Arms Orientation. The roster may not specify the training tools the US taught, but it illustrates that the US substantially trained Chilean personnel through the extensive list of courses offered.

Limited declassified DoD documents further reveal the US's considerable funds invested for the training of Chilean personnel and the wide range of technical skills instructed. In 1966 alone, out of 41 countries, the DoD allocated the third highest number of funds for foreign security training in Chile—about \$564,162 (Counterinsurgency Bluebook 1966: 85-87). Additional DoD documents reveal a range of “Counterinsurgency Operation” courses that simply instructed on the management of intelligence missions, to “Infantry Officer” class instruction on the technical handling of weapons, and even airborne training (Department of Defense, 1966; Counterinsurgency Bluebook 1966: 165-178). These declassified sources on the SOA provide only vague descriptions of the US's training curriculum.

The primary documents may lack information on training content; however, the considerable number of Chileans trained, the variety of courses, the US's mass funding, and the numerous technical skills instructed reveal that the US significantly trained Chilean personnel.

Figure 1. The Number of Chilean Personnel Who Graduated the SOA Over Time.



2. US Tools and Behaviors Promoted Through Training: The Foundations for the Human Rights Violations Committed by Chilean Personnel

As laid out in the KUBARK manual, the US trained the Chilean personnel in a variety of tools and methods that constituted violations under the UDHR, particularly Articles 5 and 9 (United Nations 1948). Some were “direct” violations, tools explicitly outlawed by the UDHR. Others were more “indirect,” meaning that they would lead to rights violations if they were repeatedly applied to an individual or used in a prolonged manner.

While US declassified documents on the SOA do not reveal training content, the CIA's KUBARK manual presents 128 pages of interrogation techniques instructed to Latin American personnel. The techniques are primarily based on mid-20th-century research by psychologists who conducted experimental studies testing the effects of pain, confinement, hunger, and threats. The CIA also bases some of the KUBARK tools on (1) US "mind control" and "brainwashing" methods tried on Vietnam War detainees and (2) methods tested by the Soviet Union on its prisoners (Hajjar 2012; CIA 1963:110). The CIA divides its KUBARK manual into interrogation phases with one goal: the psychological and physical breaking of resistant Communist *enemies*. The tools identified in this section were *all* promoted by the US as supposedly effective methods that coerce detainees into revealing their alleged connection to the Soviet Union.

The CIA included rhetorically framed *suggested* trainee methods in the various sections of its manual. The manual contained the following: legal warnings, preferred interrogator qualities, typical detainee personalities, the screening phase, planning phase, non-coercive and coercive tools, and a curated bibliography with 46 psychological studies and US sources (CIA 1963). The CIA avoids rhetoric that reveals their recommended psychological techniques and, instead, frames the manual as supposed guidelines. Still, in the manual, the CIA repeatedly recommends trainees read its bibliography, which describes the psychological and physical effects of methods like confinement. Thus, the bibliography represents the US's indirect endorsement of repressive methods or behavior by security personnel. The following discussion uses my interpretation of UDHR principles to evaluate the covertly promoted US tools.

Five KUBARK Tools That Promoted Direct Human Rights Violations

In particular, the manual recommends that officers use five classes of tools. These tools are direct human rights violations that seek to control detainees, isolate them from society, and ultimately break their resistance.

First, in an effort to “induce acquiescence,” the KUBARK manual recommends the use of electrocution (CIA 1963: 8, 46, 82). KUBARK advises that prior to questioning, security personnel should inform high-ranked officials of their planned use of electrocution, given that the officials must set up an interrogation room with all the necessary devices (CIA 1963: 8, 46, 82). The CIA instructs personnel to prepare large voltage-fueled machines and vaguely referenced “modifying” tools (CIA 1963: 8, 46, 82).²

The second class of tools the US recommends is for the removal of sensory stimuli (CIA 1963: 76). KUBARK recommends that personnel control the detainee and their environment by interrogating them in a colorless empty room and completely eliminating their senses—vision, smell, hearing, feeling, and taste (CIA 1963: 45, 89-90). The manual informs personnel that the method not only induces anxiety and fear but also effectively blocks individuals from any contact with society (CIA 1963: 90).

The US’s recommended removal of sensory stimuli also includes the promotion of detention and solitary confinement as additional techniques (CIA 1963: 82). Based on National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) studies and other research cited in KUBARK, the CIA’s manual recommends that officials create “an environment still more subject to control, such as [a] **water-tank or iron lung**, [as they are] even more effective” (CIA 1963: 88-90). The devices the US suggests block all sounds and visual stimuli by enclosing detainees in large metal containers of water. The manual and its sources inform officials that detention and solitary

² The KUBARK manual refers to the devices that electrocute detainees as “modifying tools” or “transformer machines,” but it is unclear what particular equipment was recommended.

confinement cause “stress, hallucinations, and delusions” effective for interrogation (CIA 1963: 89; CIA 1956: 26). The bibliography further guides Chilean personnel to read sources like “Communist Control Techniques” and the “Psychology of Confession,” which find that isolation has the same effects as physical violence (CIA 1956: 26-30).

The third and fourth classes of tools the US suggests are the prolonged restrictions on food and water and the application of higher or lower-than-average room temperatures. The manual states that, for their purposes, it is ineffective to completely starve or keep detainees in uninhabitable temperatures (CIA 1963: 92-93). Instead, the CIA guides officials to feed detainees at different hours of the day (CIA 1963: 77, 92-93). The manual’s recommended reading—“Communist Control Techniques”—instructs officers to keep detainees “always hungry,” as this weakens the physical state and tears psychological resistance (CIA 1956: 26, 93). Similarly, the manual endorses a reading that instructs personnel to shake up an individual’s psyche by modifying room temperatures to be either “too hot” or “too cold” (CIA 1956: 26).

The fifth class of tools the US recommends to Chilean personnel are ways to restrict detainees from sleeping. The CIA promotes the following interrogation strategy for detainees: isolation, re-entrance into a detention cell, a 5-minute sleep period, and then questioning (CIA 1963: 49). The CIA’s bibliography source further guides officials to the Czech model (CIA 1963: 117). The manual commends the Czech personnel for not using physical violence but instead coercing a detainee’s confession through psychological tactics like the 42-hour-long sleep deprivation (CIA 1963: 117). The CIA equips personnel with the Czech method and interrogation strategies that ultimately deprive detainees of sleep.

Three KUBARK Themes That Promoted Indirect Human Rights Violations

In addition to promoting methods that directly violate UDHR principles, the KUBARK manual promotes several themes that indirectly lead to human rights violations. I highlight three key themes that endorse the use of repressive tools against detainees. Similar to the five tools in the previous section, the themes aim to equip personnel with methods that control detainees and break their resistance.

First, a theme I find in KUBARK is the psychological manipulation of detainees (United Nations 1948). Before the interrogation, the manual recommends that officers “psychologically screen” detainees by determining their personality type, knowledge of counterintelligence, and level of resistance (CIA 1963: 30-37, 54). If the official finds that the detainee is resistant, the screening technique instructs the use of “coercive” tools—e.g., electrocution or solitary confinement (CIA 1963: 30-37). The US trained officers to use their discretion when screening detainees, which encouraged and endorsed the use of repressive tools that could have led to rights violations.

Within KUBARK’s psychological manipulation theme, the CIA recommends Chilean personnel hire experts that can administer the application of “coercive” tools (CIA 1963: 95). As described by a Villa Grimaldi survivor, Pedro Matta, the presence of a medical expert can increase the severity of these repressive techniques (personal communication, August 07, 2024).³ For instance, if an expert is present during interrogations, they can inform the official of the maximum level of torture possible before causing a detainee’s death (P. Matta, personal communication, August 07, 2024). In the manual, the CIA acknowledged that hiring a medical expert would indirectly lead to repressive behavior or violations, like torture, but still promoted the tool to Chilean security personnel (CIA 1963: 59, 95; United Nations 1948).

³ Villa Grimaldi was a detention center in Chile during the dictatorship. I had the opportunity to listen to Pedro Matta’s testimony in Chile during a walkthrough of the atrocious torture facility.

A second theme was the subordination of detainees through the creation of an infant-to-parent or a superior-to-subject relationship (CIA 1963: 40, 116). Through studies by Farber, Meerlo, and Biderman, the manual instructs officials to act as a “superior” or “parent” by deciding when detainees would eat or sleep and “whether [they] would be rewarded for good behavior, or **punished** for being bad” (CIA 1963: 52). Through the recommendations to “punish” detainees, the US encouraged the use of “coercive” tools—like the water tank method—and taught personnel that because the detainees were inferior or worthless, it was acceptable to violate their human rights (CIA 1963: 53-54, 83-90; United Nations 1948).

A final theme I find in the US training manual is brainwashing through hypnosis and drugs (CIA 1963: 95-100; United Nations 1948). The manual recommends personnel use these mind “regression” tools, as they effectively break a detainee’s psyche through “disorientation, hallucination, and manipulation” (CIA 1963: 100). Although the CIA acknowledges the dangerous psychological effects of hypnosis and drugs, the manual only dedicates three sentences out of a two-page section to warn officials against the overuse of the brainwashing tools.

3. Extensive Links Between Methods Promoted by the US and Chilean Personnel Behavior

The methods used by Chilean personnel to commit rights violations largely mirrored the tools promoted by US training through KUBARK. In order to illustrate the link between KUBARK tools and Chilean force methods, I draw from the 2003-2005 Valech Report that details the tools and behaviors of Chilean security personnel who committed rights abuses.

Prior even to the training, there is additional evidence that the US shaped Chilean personnel behavior through its influence on DINA—the security apparatus primarily responsible

for gross violations in Chile. In designing DINA, Chilean military officials based its blueprint on (a) the US's global, mid-20th century "secret police" organizations (e.g., South Korea's KCIA) and (b) CIA guidance for the institution of an autonomous military (Latin American Studies, n.d.). Evidence that the 1972-1976 CIA director General Vernon supplied DINA with organizational support, training manuals, and security personnel reveals the US's administrative role in DINA (Latin American Studies, n.d.). The 1974 banquet hosted for DINA director Manuel Contreras and a 1976 letter between the US and Contreras further depicts the US's communication with DINA's personnel (National Security Archive, 2024: 2; Contreras 1976). The strongest indication that the US had a role in DINA is that the CIA made year-long payments to Contreras in 1975 (National Security Archive, 2024). These pieces of evidence suggest that the US potentially influenced Chilean behavior through its cornerstone role as a founder of the most abusive 1973-1977 Chilean military.

Links Between US Training Tools and Chilean Security Personnel Behavior

Through a direct comparison of the KUBARK manual and the Valech report, Table 1 highlights striking similarities between US training tools and the types of abuses carried out by Chilean personnel.

First, Chilean forces made regular use of electrical interrogation, a tool KUBARK promoted. The Valech Report reveals that Chilean officials electrocuted nearly a third of detainees—11,956—thus, it was the most commonly used method of torture (Informe 2005: 217). Valech describes that officials carried out electrocution in two forms: (1) the *parrilla* ("grill") method, which blindfolded, enforced nudity, and used a metal cot for "sensitive" body part electrocution, and (2) the *picana* ("prod") tool that used a rod to apply electricity (Informe

2005: 25, 291). Mirroring the US's instructions to prepare an interrogation room with proper voltage-fueled electrocution devices, Chilean personnel prepared DINA rooms with 220-volt devices for the electrocution of detainees (Informe 2005: 235). As recommended in KUBARK, Chilean personnel used electrocution to interrogate, extract information, and break a detainee's resistance.

The second class of tools, extensively instructed in KUBARK that appeared in Valech, is the elimination of sensory stimuli. Valech testimonies explicitly refer to a KUBARK recommendation: long periods of small-scale, dark, and isolated detention and solitary confinement (CIA 1963: 87-90, 284). In parallel to KUBARK's instructions, personnel confined detainees in solitary cells to eliminate their senses and thus deteriorate their psychological and physical states (CIA 1963: 247, 284; Informe 2005: 284). A particular tool Chilean personnel used was the *submarino* ("submarine") method, which was an interrogation technique that drowned individuals in a 250-liter cylinder tank (Informe 2005: 25, 250). The tank mirrors the recommended US technique that used the "water tank" or "iron lung" cylinder capsule to similarly control movement, isolate, and break the resistance of their enemy (CIA 1963: 90).

Third, I find a link between the KUBARK manual's endorsed use of higher or lower-than-average room temperatures and the extreme application of the tools by Chilean personnel (Informe 2005: 285). The recommended bibliography sources in the manual train officials to apply "too hot" or "too cold" room temperatures to create discomfort and disturb a detainee's psyche (CIA 1956: 26). The KUBARK temperature recommendation was foundational for Chilean detainee treatment, as Chile's security personnel employed temperatures that tested the limits of human capacity. For instance, in September of 1973, an official demanded that a detainee be stripped naked in the freezing snow (Informe 2005: 250-251). Security personnel

applied excessive temperatures to detainees, with a goal that paralleled KUBARK's recommendations—to cause the “physical or mental suffering” that breaks detainee resistance (Informe 2005: 250-251).

These examples do not demonstrate with certainty that Chilean forces used these tools because of US training. Nevertheless, as highlighted in the parallel columns in Table 1, the similarities between KUBARK recommendations and Chilean behavior are clear and give strong reason to suspect that US training played a significant role in shaping Chile's human rights violations.

A few notable tools promoted in KUBARK that are even more directly linked to the methods used by Chilean personnel against detainees are the restrictions on food, water, and sleep (Informe 2005: 285). Similar to KUBARK's bibliography readings that recommended personnel break detainee resistance by keeping them “always hungry,” Chilean officers “diminished [detainees'] capacity for resistance” and weakened their physical and psychological states by restricting food and water (CIA 1956: 26; Informe 2005: 248, 286, 426). Another tool instructed by the US that was linked to Chilean personnel behavior was the “deprivation” of a detainee's sleep (Informe 2005: 286). KUBARK training appears to have been the foundation for the later magnified use of the tool, as Chilean officials disturbed a detainee's sleep but worsened repression through beatings, bright lights, and deafening sounds (Informe 2005: 248-249). For instance, a Chilean detainee stated that personnel purposely deprived him of sleep through “days and nights” of repeated beatings and electrocution (Informe 2005: 287). The disruption of sleep mirrors the KUBARK's guidance for a detainee's days-long isolation and the 42-hour-long sleep deprivation technique from the Czech reading (CIA 1963: 49, 117). While KUBARK did not advise for the full deprivation of sleep, food, and water, the link between the manual's tools and

Chilean behavior suggests that US training exacerbated the violations committed by personnel (Informe 2005: 248-249, 286).

Table 1. Links between US Training and Chilean Personnel Behavior⁴

Classes of Tools Instructed in KUBARK	Chilean Personnel Methods
Electrocution	<p>Electrocution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11,956 Valech testimonies declared they were subject to electrocution. It was the most commonly used method between 1974-1977 • Two forms of electrocution include: 1) the <i>parrilla</i> method and 2) the <i>picana</i> tool
<p>Security personnel were instructed to block detainees from sensory stimuli</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detention/Solitary Confinement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ (e.g., water tank/ iron lung) 	<p>Blocked detainees from sensory stimuli</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detention/Solitary Confinement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ (e.g., submarine method) ○ Detainees were placed in cells completely cut off from any social interaction
Trainees were advised to apply higher or lower-than-average room temperatures	<p>Valech testimonies indicate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detainees were subject to scorching heat and freezing temperatures
Trainees were advised to prolong the restrictions of food and water	<p>Valech testimonies indicate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individuals were deprived of food and water for days, weeks, or months
Trainees were advised to restrict detainees from sleeping	<p>Valech testimonies indicate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To ensure detainees did not sleep, officials did the following: maintained bright lights in the cell, created noises, and beat individuals

Links Between US Training Themes and Chilean Security Personnel Behavior

⁴ (CIA 1963: 8, 46, 49, 76, 77, 82, 92, 93; Informe 2005: 25, 217, 249, 250, 284, 285, 291).

Table 2 highlights three themes the US promoted in its KUBARK training manual that are similar to the behavior of Chilean personnel who committed rights abuses.

The first KUBARK theme that I find is linked to Chilean personnel behavior is psychological manipulation against detainees. KUBARK's psychological screening recommendation, which determined the detainee's level of resistance and the "coercive" tools for interrogation, is recorded in the methods used by Chilean officials (CIA 1963: 30-37). Chilean personnel did the following: "evaluate physical resistance, before or during torture, *to adjust the intensity of the [electrical] discharges*" (Informe 2005: 234). Additionally, similar to KUBARK's instruction to hire "experts" during hypnosis sessions, Chilean officers hired "medical experts" for electrical torture (CIA 1963: 95; Informe 2005: 233). For instance, Valech records a testimony by a woman who, after waking up from an atrocious torture session, was checked by a stethoscope, with officials declaring, "*that is enough for today*" (Informe 2005: 234). US training influenced the use of psychological manipulation tools that could "intensify" the level of electrocution or their beatings to a degree that did not cause death but broke the detainees (Informe 2005: 234).

The second thematic link between US training and Chilean personnel behavior is the subordination of detainees. In parallel to KUBARK, which recommends particular methods to create a superior-to-subject relationship, Valech documents the humiliation methods used by personnel to diminish detainees as inferior or 'nonhumans' (CIA 1963: 40-42, 116). Chilean officials coerced detainees to do the following: consume excrement, kiss personnel boots, crawl on the floor for officer entertainment, and ask for forgiveness while "recognizing the **superiority** of military officials" (Informe 2005: 239). As instructed through US training, Chilean officials further built up their superiority by enforcing nudity and confining detainees into cage-like

structures where “circus lions were placed” (Informe 2005: 247, 251). Other detainees were hauled “like yokes of oxen” in negative 10-degree temperatures (Informe 2005: 247, 251). While these examples are not explicit evidence that US training shaped Chilean personnel behavior, there is clear evidence in a 1973 Valech testimony that states [translated]:

*“The [Chilean personnel] applied electrical currents all over my body, especially on my genitals. These officers yelled at me that they were commanders trained in **Panama [the SOA]**.... I received beatings in the ears...they yelled that I wouldn’t get out of there alive... I was dragged by the hair to a room with a group.... [and they said]: Here is your boss and this is how we treat these dogs”* (Informe 2005: 237).

The above quote strongly reveals that the US-promoted “superiority” belief influenced the tools and behaviors of Chilean personnel who committed violations. The testimony unveils that by (1) simply attending the most prestigious US training facility—the SOA or “Panama”—and (2) by being trained by a KUBARK curriculum that promoted the “superiority” of officials, Chilean personnel felt entitled to beating or electrocuting the supposedly inferior detainees. Mirroring US training, officials established a superior-to-subject relationship, which exacerbated the repression and rights violations against civilians.

Valech Report testimonies do not explicitly record whether Chilean personnel used the KUBARK-promoted theme of brainwashing through hypnosis and drugs. In the 537-page report, there are only seven testimonies that record instances where Chilean personnel coerced detainees to take drugs (e.g., hallucinogenic drugs or pentothal) (Informe 2005: 517). The testimonies also do not record whether Chilean security personnel hypnotized detainees. The following are two reasons why the Valech report may not reflect the use of brainwashing: (1) The methods were not as prevalent as commonly referenced tools, like electrocution, and (2) Valech only records the

testimonies of a fraction of the millions who endured rights violations; thus, the detainees who security personnel did brainwash, may not have been interviewed for Valech’s report.

Chilean personnel behavior mirrored KUBARK-promoted themes of psychological manipulation and the subordination of detainees. While these thematic links do not demonstrate that US training directly shaped Chilean behavior, they strongly suggest that the US promoted behavior that exacerbated the violations committed by Chilean personnel.

Table 2. Links between US Training and Chilean Personnel Behavior⁵

KUBARK Themes	Chilean Personnel Methods
Psychological manipulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of the psychological screening technique prior to interrogation • Hiring psychologists or medical professionals to apply “coercive” tools (e.g., electrocution) 	Psychological manipulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The screening technique similarly “evaluated physical resistance, before or during torture, <i>to adjust the intensity of the [electrical] discharges.</i>” • Personnel hired “medical experts” to apply “coercive” methods (e.g., electrocution).
Treatment of detainees as inferior	Treatment of detainees as inferior/non-humans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The report indicates a complete dehumanization of detainees. Individuals were treated as non-humans.
Brainwashing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hypnosis • Drugs 	Brainwashing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Valech testimonies do not record instances of hypnosis, except in the 1980s—a period outside of my research focus. • A limited number of testimonies record detainees who were drugged.

4. A Significant Number of US-Trained Personnel Carried Out Human Rights Violations

⁵ (CIA 1963: 40 54, 95-100, 116; Informe 2005: 233, 234, 239, 414, 517).

Among the Chilean officers trained by the US, a substantial number committed human rights violations during Chile's dictatorship. To investigate the number of trained Chileans who committed abuses, I draw from human rights organizations and universities, including Equipo Nizkor and La Universidad de Chile. The organizations cross-reference SOA graduate names from the SOAW's 60,000-person roster to public trial records that document human rights violations (McCoy 2005: 51). In order to expand my investigation, I use the SOAW roster to cross-reference a random sample of 220 SOA graduates with primarily ChatGPT and the Spanish-language Memoria Viva website, which tracks online articles exposing the abuses committed by Chile's security personnel.

This study is significant as almost a fifth of the SOA graduates I cross-referenced committed human rights abuses. First, I find that human rights organizations have only identified 27 distinct SOA graduates who committed violations during the dictatorship. Secondly, out of my 220-person sample, I identified 38 additional Chilean security personnel who carried out rights violations that had not been linked to US training by organizations.⁶ At the end of this thesis, I include an Appendix that reveals the substantial number of trainees who carried out abuses, with 65 security personnel recognized in this study.

Among the 65 SOA-trained Chilean officers who committed violations, several personnel used the methods and behaviors promoted by the US through the KUBARK manual. One of the methods is the subordination of detainees. For instance, the security official Rene Riveros told a detainee—Manuel Guerrero Alvarez—that he was the “owner of [his] life” and “he could do whatever he wanted” with him (CIA 1963: 40, 116; Memoria Viva, n.d.). US training promoted the belief that detainees were “inferior” or even non-humans, thus endorsing the abuses

⁶ Chilean attorneys and human rights justice activists continue to advocate for the judicial trials of Chilean personnel involved in 1973-1990 violations. Thus, we can expect that with increased trials and public records, scholars will find increased numbers of US-trained Chilean personnel who committed violations.

committed by officials like Riveros (MemoriaViva, n.d.). Additionally, a second method the Chilean officers used to commit violations that mirror US methods is electrical interrogation (MemoriaViva, n.d.-a). Two separate officials, Luis Alberto Aldea and Cossio Urrutia Felipe, prepared an interrogation room with devices for electrical torture—a specific recommendation in KUBARK (CIA 1963: 8, 46, 82; MemoriaViva, n.d.-a). These examples suggest that even among the 65-person sample, evidence suggests that US training methods influenced the types of rights violations committed by Chilean personnel.

The considerable number of Chilean personnel who committed a range of human rights abuses with methods that mirror the US-promoted tools unveil a strong link between US training and Chile's rights violations.

Conclusion: The Urgency to Create Restrictions on US Training Facilities

Foreign military training was a key mechanism the US used to intervene and maintain hegemony in the suspected Communist states of Latin America. Through (1) growing human rights concerns after the Vietnam War, (2) links between Latin American personnel and gross rights violations, and (3) the declassification of training manuals, human rights advocates argued that US training exacerbated the violations committed by foreign security personnel. However, literature has not unveiled the particular mechanisms through which the US may have shaped abuses abroad.

My study centers on Chile to examine *how* US training exacerbated the human rights violations committed by security personnel. Through CIA declassified documents and public reports, I conduct a four-step examination. While this study cannot demonstrate that the US directly influenced the behavior of Chilean personnel, it sheds light on ample mechanisms that

link US training and rights violations carried out by Chilean officers. By unveiling *how* the training shaped Chilean military behavior, this investigation fills in the gaps in academic literature and addresses an absence in US government investigations on the human rights effects of its training facilities (SOA Watch, n.d.).

Future research should continue to study the effects of US foreign military training on Latin America, as the broad links between training and violations do not reveal *how* specific countries were affected. Scholars should conduct a similar 4-step investigation into the mechanisms that shaped personnel behavior in the more than 17 Latin American countries the US trained. Research should investigate whether other Latin American military officials also used the tools the US promoted—e.g., electrocution, the elimination of sensory stimuli, etc. With the continued advocacy for the declassification of CIA documents by NGOs, grassroots activists, and scholars, additional sources will emerge for further examinations into the effects of US training in particular Latin American countries.

The findings in this study raise a vital point: Major superpowers, like the US, have a significant capacity to shape a state's military behavior. While this study was a Cold War case, human rights advocates and scholars should consider the Chilean case when assessing the US's continued training of foreign personnel. The SOA still trains Latin American officials, except now under a new facility name—the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) (SOA Watch, n.d.). The Department of Defense (DoD) argues that the 18 million dollar facility teaches its 1,000 annual trainees humanitarian law and uses its human rights center to promote “democratic values and respect for human rights” (Department of the Army, 2024). However, these are the same statements the DoD made when it disseminated tools of torture in the 1960s and 1970s (“Policies...,” 1960, 3). Human rights advocates raise similar concerns

about the facility's training curriculum because (1) human rights groups still find links between recent WHINSEC trainees and rights abuses, and (2) WHINSEC refuses to publicize the names of its foreign military graduates (Hess, 2014). Given that US training has demonstrated its capacity to exacerbate human rights violations, it is imperative that countries demand restrictions on the types of training the US offers.

This study urges the implementation of policies that, at minimum, restrict the US from having the complete discretion to decide its training curriculum. My assessment of CIA declassified documents and current WHINSEC mission statements reveal that US paternalism fuels US training efforts in Latin America. Thus, as echoed by a Londres 38 facilitator, it is our obligation to question whether US training facilities should even exist, as they may simply be a way for the US to maintain global hegemony in supposedly “incapable” nations (personal communication, August 13, 2024).⁷ If US training exacerbated violations and expanded the “herida” in Chile, the continued concealment of WHINSEC training raises the possibility that the US is still shaping the human rights violations in Latin America today.

⁷ I had the opportunity to attend a facilitated Londres 38 tour—a key torture center during the dictatorship. The facilitator spoke on future advocacy efforts that can bring justice to Chileans affected by the human rights violations of the dictatorship.

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Appendix. Chilean Security Personnel Who Were Trained At the School of the Americas From 1964-1973 and Committed Human Rights Abuses between 1973-1977

- ❖ The first four columns of information all came from: “SOA-WHINSEC Graduate Database.” (2020, June 4). School of the Americas Watch. <https://soaw.org/soa-whinsec-graduates>
- ❖ The information for rows 1-15 derive from a key source: *Notorious Chilean School of the Americas Graduates*. (n.d.). Equipo Nizkor. <https://www.derechos.org/soa/chile-not.html>

SOA Graduate Name*	Training Dates & Length (days)*	Title*	Course*	Role in Chile	Link to Human Rights Violations
Hugo Acevedo	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)		Combat Arms Orientation	"Promotion partner" for General Pinochet and assistant to Manuel Contreras—DINA head. ⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to Luz Arce, Acevedo was key in the repressive forces of DINA.⁹
Pablo L. Belmar	29 Jan - 23 Feb 1968 (25)	Second Lieutenant	Básico/Orientación p' Of/Armas	Brigadier in the Chilean Army. Active in DINA. Served as the commander of an operational group. ¹⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the “1976 torture and murder of Carmelo Soria.” Belmar was convicted of this crime in 2023 with a 10-year sentence. He has evaded this crime and, since then, has continued to receive pension. Belmar was also involved in other human rights abuses.¹¹
Alfonso Faundez Norambuena	20 Jan - 20 Feb 1969 (31)	Second Lieutenant	Chilean Officer Orientation	"Orientation official" and head at Villa Grimaldi. ¹²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involvement in Villa Grimaldi indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.¹³
Armando Fernandez Larios	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	DINA official. ¹⁴ ** Joined DINA with Rene Riveros, another 1970 SOA-trained official.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Second in charge in the 1973 Caravan of Death, which led to torture and murders. Responsible for the assassination of former defense minister Prats, his wife (1974), and the assassination of foreign minister Orlando Letelier (1976).¹⁵
Carlos Herrera Jiménez	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Chilean Army Officer. ¹⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in Pisagua—a commune in Chile where tortures, murders, and disappearances occurred. He admitted to his role as a second lieutenant at the detainment camps, stating he “just followed orders.” It revealed his complicity in the dictatorship's human rights abuses.

⁸ Acevedo Godoy Hugo César. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-a/acevedo-godoy-hugo-cesar/>

⁹ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. Notorious Graduates from Chile | SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas. <https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

¹⁰ Belmar Labbé Pablo Fernando. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-b/belmar-labbe-pablo-fernando/>

¹¹ Ibid.

Prófugos y millonarios: Ex Dina Condenados Por Asesinato de Carmelo Soria Cobran Pensión Siendo Fugitivos de la Justicia. Interferencia. (2024, March 22).

<https://interferencia.cl/articulos/profugos-y-millonarios-ex-dina-condenados-por-asesinato-de-carmelo-soria-cobran-pension>

¹² Estructura Dina - Memoria Viva. (n.d.). <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/DINA.PDF>

¹³ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. Notorious Graduates from Chile | SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

¹⁴ Uchile, D. (2014, November 19). *Confesión de Riveros Valderrama: “Yo Maté Al Tirano.”* Diario y Radio Universidad Chile.

<https://radio.uchile.cl/2014/11/19/confesion-de-riveros-valderrama-yo-mate-al-tirano/>

¹⁵ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

¹⁶ Herrera Jiménez Carlos Alberto Fernando. (n.d.). Memoria Viva.

<https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-h/herrera-jimenez-carlos-alberto-fernando/>

			**Attended the same course as Raul Eduardo Iturriaga Neumann.		particularly those conducted in December of 1974. ¹⁷
Raul Eduardo Iturriaga Neumann	7 May 1965	First Lieutenant	Basic Airborne Course	DINA's "General Staff"—the management of DINA. Involved in the economic department for DINA operations. Official at Villa Grimaldi and Vendo Sexy—two primary torture centers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to Luz Arce, Neumann exploited political prisoners. He tortured political prisoners, mandating them to become collaborators (e.g., secretaries and analysts) for DINA offices. One of the military officers cited in Pinochet's judicial records that tried him for human rights violations; Neumann was cited in the "Spanish Human Rights Case of 1998." Allegedly involved in more than 40 kidnappings, including the following Chilean citizens: Jaime Buzio, Mario Calderón, Cecilia Castro, Rodolfo Espejo, Albano Fioraso, Gregorio Gaete, Mauricio Jorquera, Isidro Pizarro, Marcos Quiñones and Gilberto Urbina.
Fernando Lauriani	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation **Attended the same course as Carlos Herrera Jimenez in 1971.	Second in command for the Jose Domingo Canas cartel in DINA. ¹⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A part of the kidnapping and disappearance of two brothers (1974) — Juan Carlos and Jorge Elias Andronico Antequera. The case was closed when transferred to military court. Pinochet assisted in the dismissal of the case. One of the military officers cited in Pinochet's judicial records that tried him for human rights violations; Lauriani was cited in the "Spanish Human Rights Case of 1998."¹⁹
Jaime Lepe Orellana	1968	Unclear	Basic Arms Orientation Course	Unclear.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recorded involvement in the torture of UN official Carmelo Soria. Soria's death was staged as accidental; officers put the body and car in the Santiago Canal.²⁰
Augusto Lutz	7 Mar - 9 Dec 1966 (277)	Lieutenant Colonel	Command and Staff	Military junta Chief of Intelligence during the first years of the dictatorship. ²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Chief of Intelligence role indicates he was involved in the detention centers and thus responsible for atrocious human rights violations.²²
Odlanier Mena	16 Mar - 18 Dec 1970 (277)	Lieutenant Colonel	Command and Staff	Officer at the Vendo Sexy and ex Cuartel Terranova. Replaced Manuel Contreras (head of DINA) in the CNI. ²³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the military officers cited in Pinochet's judicial records that tried him for human rights violations; Mena was cited in the "Spanish Human Rights Case of 1998."²⁴

¹⁷ Herrera Jiménez Carlos Alberto Fernando. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. [https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-h/herrera-jimenez-ca](https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-h/herrera-jimenez-carlos-alberto-fernando/)

¹⁸ Estructura Dina - Memoria Viva. (n.d.). <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/DINA.PDF>

¹⁹ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

²⁰ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

²¹ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

²² Ibid.

²³ Estructura Dina - Memoria Viva. (n.d.). <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/DINA.PDF>

²⁴ Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*. SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

Manuel Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Officer at Villa Grimaldi. ²⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in Villa Grimaldi indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.²⁶
Manuel Provis Carrasco	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Officer at Ex Cuartel Terranova, Venda Sexy, and Villa Grimaldi. ²⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in various torture centers indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.²⁸
Marco Antonio Saez Saavedra	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Officer at Villa Grimaldi. Instructor of the "National Intelligence School" formed by DINA. ²⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in Villa Grimaldi indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.³⁰
Carlos Parera Silva	31 Mar - 6 June 1969 (67)	Captain	Irregular Warfare Operations	DINA official. Officer at Villa Grimaldi. ³¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in Villa Grimaldi indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.³²
Jose Zara	7 Sep - 1 Oct 1965 (24)	Second Lieutenant	Basic Airborne in 1965 and Basic Officer Orientation in 1970.	Undersecretary of the Foreign Relations Department of DINA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involved in the assassination of two individuals: the "ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, General Carlos Pratts, and his wife."
Luis Alberto Medina Aldea	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Interrogated and identified individuals detained for "political" reasons—communist involvement. ³³ Officer at the Carcel de Rancagua. Handled secret equipment and assisted in the training and formation of Manuel Contreras' foreign operations missions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Titled the "Bestia de Rancagua"—the beast of Rancagua (a facility where torture, detainment, and executions occurred). • Found guilty on 2019 09 26 for torture by the Supreme Court. Sentenced to 200 days of imprisonment. Aldea found guilty for the torture during the interrogation of a detainee—Guillermo. He was tortured in the "Military's Prosecutor Office." He was applied electric shocks, beaten through the use of a metal bar, and threatened with death. For this torture between September to October of 1973, he was sentenced to crimes against humanity.³⁴
Eugenio A. Videla Valdiburita	7 Sep - 1 Oct 1965 (24)	Second Lieutenant	Basic Airborne t.	In charge of the "engineering school" at Tejas Verdes---a torture center. Involved in its repressive operations. General and commander of the 2nd division in the military. ³⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responsible for the death of the following individuals at San Antonio Puerto: Armando Jimenez, Samuel Nunez, Guillermo Alvarez, Hector Rojo, Raul Bacciarini, and Fidel Bravo. They were all detained between the 13th and the 22nd of September in 1973. • Responsible for tortures and murders in the concentration camp of Tejas Verdes. At Tejas Verdes, Valdiburita not only

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Roco Claudia, Katherine. (2023). "Corporalidad y Dictadura: Profesionalización de la tortura y su recriminación sexual hacia actrices políticas"

...repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/116048/López%20Ana_2013.pdf?...1.

https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/116048/L%C3%B3pez%20Ana_2013.pdf?sequence=1

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Estructura Dina - Memoria Viva. (n.d.). <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/DINA.PDF>; Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile*.

Notorious Graduates from Chile | SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

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³⁰Ibid.

³¹Estructura Dina - Memoria Viva. (n.d.). <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/DINA.PDF>

³²Estructura Dina - Memoria Viva. (n.d.). <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/DINA.PDF>

³³Corte de Santiago Condena de Oficial de Ejército (R) por aplicación de tormentos a Funcionario Municipal. (n.d.). Poder Judicial.

<https://www.pjud.cl/prensa-y-comunicaciones/noticias-del-poder-judicial/100169>

Justicia resultados de Búsqueda para "Luis Alberto Medina Aldea." Interactivo Justicia. (n.d.)

<https://interactivos.museodelamemoria.cl/justicia/sentencia.php?pdf=8318-2018.pdf&idcaratulado=387&filtro=Luis+Alberto+Medina+Aldea&victima=&condenado=on&caso=&episodio=&sentencia=&delito=&calificacion=&tribunal=&rol=®ion=>

El "Yo no lo sabía" a 50 años del golpe en Chile. El Desconcierto. (2023, August 8).

<https://eldesconcierto.cl/2023/08/08/el-yo-no-lo-sabia-a-50-anos-del-golpe-en-chile>.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Eugenio Armando Videla Valdebenito. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/criminales_v/videla_valdebenito_eugenio_arman.htm

					assassinated and tortured, but trained officials. ³⁶
Rene Riveros	1970	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Captain and involved in DINA. Involved in the Lautaro Brigade, whose purpose was to murder "Communists." **Joined DINA with Fernandez Larios, another 1970 SOA-trained official. ³⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Committed human rights abuses during his involvement in Lautaro Brigade A survivor of the 1973 dictatorship—Robinson Manuel Guerrero Alvarez—stated that Riveros told him [translated]: "He told me that he was the owner of my life, he told me that he could do whatever he wanted with me."³⁸
Rene Patricio Quilhot Palma	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Involved in the Mulchen brigade whose purpose was also to annihilate "Communists." ³⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the military officers cited in Pinochet's judicial records that tried him for human rights violations; Palma was cited in the "Spanish Human Rights Case of 1998." Involved in the 1976 assassination of Carmelo Soria UN official.⁴⁰
Ernesto Baeza Michelsen	2 Mar - 4 Dec 1964 (277)	Lieutenant Colonel		<p>Director of the Investigative Police and the head of COVEMA (Comando Vengador de Martires) that, through records, were found to have kidnapped and tortured at least 14 individuals.</p> <p>Appointed commander of the Artillery Regiment No. 2 in La Serena.</p> <p>Later, became colonel, and was involved in the Department IV of Special Services of DINA</p> <p>Also held roles as a Brigadier General and military attaché.⁴¹</p> <p>*** took additional courses in the United States at the Inter-American Defense College.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the military officers cited in Pinochet's judicial records that tried him for human rights violations; Michelsen was cited in the "Spanish Human Rights Case of 1998." Michelsen was responsible for the torture and death of alleged "Communists." Involved in the detention of individuals at the Moneda and in the Carmelo Soria case.⁴²
Pablo Martinez Latorre Abelardo	1971		Combat Arms Orientation	Chilean Army Official ⁴³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the army officers responsible for the 14 homicides that occurred in the Caravan of Death on 1973 10 18. Abelardo was sentenced to 5 years in prison on 2013 12 23.⁴⁴

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Uchile, D. (2014, November 19). *Confesión de Riveros Valderrama: "Yo Maté Al Tirano."* Diario y Radio Universidad Chile. <https://radio.uchile.cl/2014/11/19/confesion-de-riveros-valderrama-vo-mate-al-tirano/>. *The 'Dolphins' that Exterminated the Communist Party.* (2007, April 1). Memoria Viva. https://www.memoriaviva.com/English/the_workings_of_the_secret_police.htm

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Quilhot Palma René Patricio. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-q/quilhot-palma-rene-patricio/>. *The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man.* National Security Archive. (1978, March 13).

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man>

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Baeza Michelsen Ernesto. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-b/baeza-michelsen-ernesto/>. *Comando de Vengadores de Martires (COVEMA).* (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/COVEMA.htm>

⁴²Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile.* SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

Comando de Vengadores de Martires (COVEMA). (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/organizaciones/COVEMA.htm>

⁴³Vibe, M. C. (n.d.). *Notorious graduates from Chile.* SOA Watch: Close the School of the Americas.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20180718204229/http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads/notorious-grads/234-notorious-graduates-from-chile#DINA>

⁴⁴Ibid.

Sergio Espioza Davies	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Lieutenant*	Combat Arms Orientation	Unclear. Davies seems to have taken a leadership position within the dictatorship.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participated in the Secretive War Tribunals of 1973. The Tribunals “judged” dictatorship resisters—suspected Communists. In October of 1973, the tribunal convicted six individuals to death.⁴⁵
Manuel Jose Provis Carrasco	1970		Combat Arms Orientation	Official at Villa Grimaldi. ⁴⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involvement in Villa Grimaldi indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.⁴⁷
Victor Hugo Barria Baria	12 Feb - 15 Nov 1968 (277)	Lieutenant Colonel	Comando y Estado Mayor	DINA’s “General Staff”—the management of DINA ⁴⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the systematic organization of concentration camps, torture houses, and thus, responsible for assassinations, and disappearances.⁴⁹
Jorge Acuña Hahn	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	One of the officials in the Caravan of Death. ⁵⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the Caravan of Death on 1973 10 03, which passed through the city of Cauquenes. This indicates participation in torture, detainment, and other human rights violations. Involved in the homicide of Claudio Arturo Lavin Loyola, Miguel Enriquez Munoz Flores, Manuel Benito Plaza Arellano, and Pablo Renan Vera Torres.⁵¹
Hugo Acuña Sotomayor	8 May - 11 Aug 1967 (95)	Mayor	Automotive Maint Off	Commander of the Battalion “Batuco”; responsible for the area of Lampa. ⁵²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead involvement in the battalion. His role as an official in the security personnel at Lampa indicates his responsibility for the torture, disappearances, and deaths of those in the region.⁵³
Casanueva Aguila Ciro	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Security personnel in DINA and CNI between 1973 and 1978. ⁵⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the murders, tortures, kidnappings, and crimes against communities at Pisagua.⁵⁵
Jorge Garcia Addison Smith	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Involved in DINA. Not confirmed; however, he was a witness and questioned by the courts regarding the Pisagua case where individuals were tried for torture, murder, and disappearances. ⁵⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> He is presumed to have been involved in the Pisagua case—a case that involves torture, murder, and disappearances.⁵⁷
Jose Aguirre Aguirre	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Involved in the interior of the regiment of Infantry, N. 11 “Caupolicán” in the city of Porvenir. ⁵⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Condemned to 7 years in prison for human rights abuses.⁵⁹

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ *Sitio de Memoria Cuartel Borgoño*. (n.d.). Consejo De Monumentos Nacionales De Chile.

<https://www.monumentos.gob.cl/monumentos/monumentos-historicos/sitio-memoria-cuartel-borgono>

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⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Listado De Agentes De La DINA Recopilado Por Leon Gomez Araneda. Derechos Chile. (2020, June 16).

<https://www.derechoschile.com/listado-de-agentes-de-la-dina-recopilado-por-leon-gomez-araneda/>

Barria Barria Victor Hugo. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-b/barria-barria-victor-hugo/>

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Acuña Hahn Jorge Godofredo. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-a/acuna-hahn-jorge-godofredo/>

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² *Hugo Acuña Sotomayor*. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/criminales_a/acuna_sotomayor_hugo.htm

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ *Casanueva Águila Ciro*. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/casanueva-aguila-ciro/>

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ *Aguirre Aguirre José Rafael*. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-a/aguirre-aguirre-jose-rafael/>

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Jorge Aitken Pezoa	8 Sep - 27 Nov 1970 (80)	Captain	Abastecimiento General para Oficiales	Unclear. ⁶⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Memoria Viva identifies Jorge as involved in dictatorship human rights abuses.⁶¹
Luis Albornoz Costa	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Chilean military official. ⁶²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsible for the death of Carlos Enrique Mario Nicholls Rivera, Servando Antonio González Maureira y Jaime Pablo Millanao Canihuán.⁶³
Pedro Espinoza Cáceres	29 Jan - 23 Feb 1968 (25)	Second Lieutenant	Maintenance Officer Orientation	Chilean Army Official DINA's second deputy. ⁶⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Part of the Caravan of Death in Cauquenes, Chile. Cáceres was involved in the "murder and disappearance of two individuals." In November of 1974, he was appointed to the head of Villa Grimaldi.⁶⁵
Ricardo Alvarez Jalabert	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Involved in DINA and was a sub official (non-commissioned officer) in Chile's Army. ⁶⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Convicted for involvement in human rights abuses, incarcerated in the Punta Peuco Prison—a prison for those who were involved in dictatorship-based crimes. Human Rights organizations record his name as an individual who was involved in the repression during Chile's military dictatorship. He also signed a letter that revealed responsibility for participating in rights violations.
Roberto Antonio Ampuero Alarcón	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Colonel in the Chilean Army and involved in the Pisagua detention camp. ⁶⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> January 2009, he was found to be a co-author of the kidnapping and homicide of those at Pisagua. He was sentenced to 15 years in August of 2016 for the kidnapping of: Nash, Jesus Canas Canas, and Juan Jimenez Vidal. Before conviction, he was a retired, well-pensioned, officer that received 3.8 million.⁶⁸
Jorge Andrade Gómez	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Security personnel at DINA. ⁶⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Andrade was involved in various cases related to dictatorship human rights abuses. He was convicted for the homicide of Paulina Aguirre Tobar (1985) and the kidnapping of Victor Diaz Lopez (1976). Lopez was detained and disappeared in 1976 with the "Calle Conferencia." Andrade was also involved in Operation Colombo (1974-1975). It led to the disappearance of 119 political opponents, particularly the kidnapping of Jorge Fuentes Alarcon. Associated with other violations, including the 10 kidnappings at Villa Grimaldi (1976)—Victor Hugo Morales Mazuela, Carlos Mario Vizcarra Cofre, and Julio Roberto Vega Vega.⁷⁰

⁶⁰ Jorge Aitken Pezoa. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/criminales_a/aitken_pezoa_jorge.htm

⁶¹ Jorge Aitken Pezoa. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. https://www.memoriaviva.com/criminales/criminales_a/aitken_pezoa_jorge.htm

⁶² Albornoz Costa Luis Rodrigo. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-a/albornoz-costa-luis-rodrigo/>

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Quezada, R. T. (2014, April 26). *Lo confirman: La CIA entrenó a los aparatos de inteligencia en Chile*. Diario La Batalla de Maipú.

<https://www.labatalla.cl/lo-confirman-la-cia-entreno-a-los-aparatos-de-inteligencia-en-chile/>

⁶⁵ Espinoza Bravo Pedro Octavio. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-e/espinoza-bravo-pedro-octavio/>

⁶⁶ Ricardo Alvarez Jalabert Archivos. (n.d.). Expedientes de la Represión.

https://expedientesdelarepresion.cl/victimarios-condenados/ricardo-alvarez-jalabert/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

⁶⁷ El Mostrador. (2023, September 12). *Violadores de DDHH Presos en Punta Peuco Acusan "Pávido Silencio" de 33 años de sus superiores*. El Mostrador.

https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2023/09/12/violadores-de-ddhh-presos-en-punta-peuco-acusan-pavido-silencio-de-33-anos-de-sus-superiores/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-g/guerrero-reeve-gabriel-alfonso/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Jorge Claudio Andrade Gómez. CIPER Chile. (n.d.). <https://www.ciperchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/Jorge-Claudio-Andrade-Gómez.pdf>

Andrade Gómez Jorge Claudio. Memoria Viva. (n.d.-a).

https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-a/andrade-gomez-jorge-claudio/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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<https://www.pjud.cl/prensa-y-comunicaciones/noticias-del-poder-judicial/96178>

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Jorge A. Letelier Villagran	5 Apr - 9 Jul 1971 (95)	Sergeant	Jefes de Comunicaciones	Official at Ex Cuartel Terranova and Venda Sexy. ⁷¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in torture centers indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.⁷²
Eduardo Fernando Lauriani Maturana	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (31)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Official at Ex Cuartel Terranova and Venda Sexy. ⁷³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in torture centers indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.⁷⁴
Haroldo Latorre Sánchez	20 Jan - 20 Feb 1969 (31)	Second Lieutenant	Chilean Off Orientation	Official at Ex Cuartel Terranova and Venda Sexy. ⁷⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in torture centers indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.⁷⁶
Javier Labbe Galilea Francisco	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Official at Ex Cuartel Terranova and Venda Sexy. ⁷⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement in torture centers indicates the individual participated in human rights abuses.⁷⁸
Pedro N. Barrientos	29 Jan - 23 Feb 1968 (25)	Second Lieutenant	Básico/Orientación p' Of/Armas	A DINA Officer involved in Chile's National Stadium—a torture center. ⁷⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016, Barrientos was found guilty for the torture and murder of Victor Jara (a revolutionary Chilean artist) and another identified detainee.⁸⁰
Juan Bascur Gaete	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Official in the Army Aviation Command (CAE). ⁸¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suspected to be one of the pilots in charge of throwing bodies at sea—individuals were alive with their eyesight covered.⁸²
Reinel Bocaz Rocha	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Security personnel in the Chilean Army. An official at the National Stadium. ⁸³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2021, he was found NOT responsible for the murder of Oscar Delgado Marin, given he ordered the "subordinate" and wasn't directly involved. However, investigations revealed he told the lower-ranking officer that "if it was necessary..." he could shoot him. Given his involvement in the stadium, he was most likely involuntarily in other human rights violations.⁸⁴
Fernando Born Pineda	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Security chief at Copesa. Consultant for CNI and DINA. Brigadier for DINA. ⁸⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convicted in May 2003 for kidnapping and disappearance of a DINA officer (1978). • In 2023, he was found judicially responsible for the deaths of Luis Busch Morales, Andres Rojas Marambio, and Francisco Valdivia Valdivia. This conviction fell under the trials related to dictatorship human rights abuses.⁸⁶
Marcos Bucarey Fuentes	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Lieutenant in the Rancagua Regiment in Arica 1970s. ⁸⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involved in legal processes for the human rights violations committed. Alleged to have been in charge of administering detentions under this role. Testified that he was active in this Rancagua regiment where human rights violations also occurred. He was also present in Pisagua.

⁷¹ Roco, K. C. (2023). Corporalidad y dictadura: profesionalización de la tortura y su recriminación sexual hacia actoras políticas.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ ERO Miami removes former Chilean military officer wanted for kidnapping and murder related to 1973 military coup. (2023, December 1). US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ero-miami-removes-former-chilean-military-officer-wanted-kidnapping-and-murder>

⁸⁰ ERO Miami removes former Chilean military officer wanted for kidnapping and murder related to 1973 military coup. (2023, December 1). US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ero-miami-removes-former-chilean-military-officer-wanted-kidnapping-and-murder>

⁸¹ Nuche Sepúlveda Richter Aliro. (n.d.). The Center for Justice and Accountability. <https://cja.org/updates-week-one-jara-trial-orlando/>

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Bocaz Rocha Reinel Rodope. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-b/bocaz-rocha-reinel-rodope/>

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Born Pineda Adolfo Fernando. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-b/born-pineda-adolfo-fernando/>

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ "Sentencia en Arica." (n.d.). Case File No. 64.428 (Arica). Chilean Judiciary. Retrieved from <https://www.pjud.cl>

					he was in charge of "guarding" detainees. ⁸⁸
Carlos Bunster Medina	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Sub-lieutenant in the Chilean Army. Involved in the Rancagua Regiment in Angol. ⁸⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In October 1973, he was involved in the detainment and murder of Luis Raul Cotal Alvarez and Richado Gustavo Rioseco Montoya. In 2021, he was sentenced to 19 years for the homicide of the students.⁹⁰
Antonio Bustamante Aguilar	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Officer Maintenance Course	Colonel in the Chilean Army. ⁹¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the officers involved in the detention and murder of Victor Jara. Bustamante is currently on trial for other human rights violations.⁹²
Sergio Candia Muñoz	29 May - 14 Jul 1967 (46)	Lieutenant	Pathfinder OE-73	Brigadier General, Head of the Army's Material Service. Linked to the DINA. ⁹³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the deaths of 15 people in Liquiñe, Chile.⁹⁴
Patricio Carranca S.	9 Jan - 14 Apr 1967 (45)	Second Sergeant	Combat/Construction	DINA officer in Tejas Verdes. ⁹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> His involvement in Tejas Verdes--- a Center open until 1974 for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of individuals---indicates his complicity in rights abuses. He was condemned for the death of a particular individual-- Heredia Vazquez.⁹⁶
Carreño Carlos B.	29 Jan - 23 Feb 1968 (25)	Second Lieutenant	Básico/Orientación p' Of/Armas	Colonel in the Chilean Army. ⁹⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the case of Sergio Osman Negrete Castillo. He was involved in the murder of the 19-year-old on 1973 11 18. He was sentenced to 3 years.⁹⁸
Humberto Carreño Castro	20 Jan - 20 Feb 1969 (31)	Second Lieutenant	Chilean Off Orientation	Official at the Pisagua Detention Center. ⁹⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A case was begun by the families of four individuals who were detained-disappeared at the Pisagua detention center. The following are the names of those who were kidnapped: Michael Nach Sáez, William Millar Sanhueza, Freddy Taberna Gallegos y Humberto Lizandi Flores. Under trial, he was suspected for the abuses of the above individuals.¹⁰⁰
Orlando Carter Cuadra	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Army Brigadier General. ¹⁰¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Found guilty for the murders of MIR leaders—Bautista Van Schouwen Vasey and Patricio Munita Castillo. In March of 2023, he was sentenced to 10 years.¹⁰²
Alessandro Cartoni Pruzzo	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Brigadier General in the Chilean Army. ¹⁰³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 2021 he was convicted for the murder of two students--- Richado Gustavo Rioseco Montoya and Luis Raul Cotal Alvarez in Angol. The bodies were thrown in the Malleco river.¹⁰⁴

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹ Periódico Resumen. (2023, October 25). *Condenan a 13 ex Miembros del Ejército por el crimen de dos estudiantes en octubre de 1973*. Resumen.cl. https://resumen.cl/articulos/condenan-a-13-ex-miembros-del-ejercito-por-el-crimen-de-dos-estudiantes-en-octubre-de-1973?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Bunster Medina Carlos Patricio. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-b/bunster-medina-carlos-patricio/>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ González, M. (2014, March 9). *Los Asesinos de Víctor Jara: El último Secreto*. CIPER Chile.

https://www.ciperchile.cl/2014/09/03/los-asesinos-de-victor-jara-el-ultimo-secreto/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Candia Muñoz Sergio Roberto. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/candia-munoz-sergio-roberto/>

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Carranca Saavedra Patricio Laureano Carlos. (n.d.). Memoria Viva.

<https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/carranca-saavedra-patricio-laureano-carlos/>

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Carreño Barrera Carlos Hernán. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/carreno-barrera-carlos-hernan/>

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Taberna Gallegos Freddy Marcelo. (n.d.). Memoria Viva.

<https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/ ejecutados-politicos/ ejecutados-politicos-t/taberna-gallegos-freddy-marcelo/>

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Brigadier general de ejército (R) es condenado por homicidios de dos militantes del mir « diario Y radio universidad chile. (2023, March 16).

<https://radio.uchile.cl/2023/03/16/brigadier-gral-de-ejercito-r-es-condenado-por-homicidios-de-dos-militantes-del-mir/>

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Cartoni Pruzzo Alessandro Ernesto. Memoria Viva. (n.d.).

https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/cartoni-pruzzo-alessandro-ernesto/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Eduardo Carvallo Delgado	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Officer in the Chilean Army. Officer in DINA. ¹⁰⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carvalho was under trial for human rights violations. He was investigated for the deaths of Luis Alberto, Domingo Antonio Urbina Díaz, and José Antonio Méndez Valenzuela. Luis was beaten inside of a pool, thus, causing his death. Carvalho was never convicted due to statute of limitations.¹⁰⁶
Fernando Castillo Cruz	8 Jan - 9 Feb 1973 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	A Chilean security personnel officer. ¹⁰⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the officers involved in the "Caravan of death," particularly in the events of Copiapó on 1973 10 17. Individuals kidnapped and later murdered. Sentenced to 10 years, but a few charges were acquitted. Castillo was particularly involved in the death and rights violations of Benito Tapia Tapia, Maguindo Castillo Andrade, and Ricardo García Posada.¹⁰⁸
Luis Castillo González	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Colonel for DINA. ¹⁰⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In 1974, he kidnapped Professor Javier Alberto Salinas Velasquez. Castillo was convicted to 10 years.¹¹⁰
Sergio Castillo González	20 Jan - 20 Feb 1969 (31)	First Lieutenant	Chilean Off Orientation	Head of DINA's Brigades— Puren and Leopardo, which were linked and involved in torture centers like Villa Grimaldi. Helped bring in DINA agents into the region of Rocas de Santo Domingo. Officer at Londres 38—a torture center. He also brought in DINA officers into Londres 38. ¹¹¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involvement in Villa Grimaldi and Londres 38 indicate he was involucrated in rights abuses. Castillo was also one of 98 agents responsible for Operacion Colombo—disappearance of 42 people. Involved in detention, torture, disappearance.¹¹²
Manuel Cazanga Pereira	2 Feb - 13 Feb 1970 (11)	Mayor	Special Urban Insurgency	Lead of the Department of Carabinero Police Services. DINA officer in Coquimbo, Chile. ¹¹³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> He was recognized as a lead in the detention center of Coquimbo. By being involved at the center, it can be implied that he was involved in torture and disappearances.¹¹⁴
José Cerda Bozzo	12 Jan - 13 Feb 1970 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Part of the Aguila group in DINA. Involved in covert operations against communist-suspected individuals. ¹¹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cerda is suspected of human rights violations because of his role in the "Aguila group."¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁵OpenAI. (2025, March 16). Response to query about Eduardo Carvallo Delgado's involvement in human rights violations in Chile. ChatGPT (Version 4).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Castillo Cruz Fernando Raúl de Fátima. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/castillo-cruz-fernando-raul-de-fatima/>

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Castillo González Luis Alberto. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/castillo-gonzalez-luis-alberto/>

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Castillo González Sergio Hernán. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/castillo-gonzalez-sergio-herman/>

¹¹² Criminales A. (n.d.) Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/category/criminales/criminales-a/>

¹¹³ Aguayo Espinoza Arnoldo de Jesús (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-a/aguayo-espinoza-arnoldo-de-jesus/>

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Riquelme Pino Anibal Raimundo. (n.d.). Memoria Viva.

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¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ José Sebastián Cerda Bozzo. (n.d.). Cerda Bozzo Jose Sebastian.. https://memoriaviva.com/criminales/criminales_c/cerda_bozzo_jose_sebastian.htm

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

Federico Chaigneau Sepúlveda	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	A Chilean security personnel officer in DINA. ¹¹⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in "Conferencia II" where individuals were kidnapped and disappeared. Chaigneau was convicted in June 2023.¹¹⁸
Oswaldo Cerpa Gonzalez	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Unclear. ¹¹⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has been investigated for human rights abuses, there is not clear evidence of a direct link.¹²⁰
Fernando Concha Giordano	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Chilean Army officer. ¹²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concha was convicted for human rights violations. In December 2023, he was finally convicted for the crimes of kidnapping and the "coercion" of 6 individuals. They were found to be "tortured" during interrogation. The 6 individuals were then murdered. Concha was part of the torture and murders in the Fundo El Toro.¹²²
Arturo Contador Rosales	10 Jan - 11 Feb 1972 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Chilean Army officer. ¹²³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involved in the Pisagua detention camp. Contador has been convicted for the kidnapping of the following individuals: Hector Reinaldo Pavelic Sanhueza, Luis Alberto Caucoto Ortega, Miguel Belisario Carera Riquelme, Alberto Orlando Viveros Madariaga, Juan Antonio Prieto Henriquez, and Ernesto Paul Montoya Peredo. They were all tortured, and murdered by army officers. In September of 2024, Contador was sentenced to 20 years in prison for 6 of the individuals.¹²⁴
Carlos Segundo Contreras Hidalgo	7 Sep - 1 Oct 1965 (24)	Corporal	Basic Airborne	Chilean Air Force officer. ¹²⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In September 1973, Contreras detained individuals in Antofagasta. The individuals recorded to have been tortured and arrested by this officer were: Nenad Teodorovic Sertic, Elizabeth del Carmen Cabrera Balarritz, and Luis Alberto Munoz Bravo. In 2017, he was found guilty and faced a 15 year prison charge.¹²⁶
Guillermo Cordero Hahn	3 May - 6 Aug 1971 (95)	Captain	Mantenimiento de Vehículos Motorizados p' Oficiales	A DINA security personnel officer. ¹²⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linked to the administration of centers of torture. Judicial proceedings have linked him to crimes related to torture, murder, and disappearances.¹²⁸

¹¹⁷ Collins and Ordoñez, et. al. (2023) "Que las promesas se vuelvan ciertas": Truth, Justice, Reparations, Memory and Guarantees of Non-Repetition in Chile - 25 years of Criminal Cases', authors' translation. Santiago: Observatorio Justicia Transicional
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¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Fallo Primera Instancia - caso valparaiso - 2008. (n.d.). Memoria Viva.

https://www.memoriaviva.com/Fallos/Fallo_primera_Gutierrez_Martinez_2010_mas_8_Ocho_Valparaiso_2008.doc

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¹²³ "Corte de Apelaciones de la Serena Condena a Cadena perpetua a tres oficiales en Retiro por secuestro calificado de 34 personas." (2024, September 6). El Clarín De Chile.

<https://www.elclarin.cl/2024/09/06/corte-de-apelaciones-de-la-serena-condena-a-cadena-perpetua-a-tres-oficiales-en-retiro-por-secuestro-calificado-de-34-personas/>

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¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Contreras Hidalgo Carlos Segundo. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/contreras-hidalgo-carlos-segundo/>.

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¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ OpenAI. (2025, March 16). Response to query on Guillermo Cordero Hahn and his involvement in Chile's human rights violations. ChatGPT (Version 4).

¹²⁸ Ibid.

<i>Felipe Cossio Urrutia</i>	11 Jan - 12 Feb 1971 (32)	Second Lieutenant	Combat Arms Orientation	Chilean Army officer. A Captain in the Arauco Regiment. ¹²⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under investigation for the torture of detained peoples in Arauco and across detention centers. • Testimonies have recorded him being involved in the interrogations, particularly held in the prosecutor's headquarters where individuals were tortured. • Identified by three individuals as a torturer in the case of the disappearance of Mario Sandoval Vasquez. • At Arauco, an individual testifies that the torture Cossio applied was said to include the "application of electricity across different areas of the body." Testimony declared, "he took statements from the detainees, both officers were intelligence officers. In that place the detainees were interrogated and tortured with electric current, situations that I had to witness on several occasions. " This occurred in September of 1973 in the Fiscalia Militar. • Another individual identified Cossio as involved in torture at the "Hospital Nuevo."¹³⁰
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¹²⁹ Cossio Urrutia Felipe. (n.d.). Memoria Viva. <https://memoriaviva.com/nuevaweb/criminales/criminales-c/cossio-urrutia-felipe/>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.